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joint_enterprise [2017/09/29 16:19] (current)
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 1. The guidance sets out how charging decisions are to be approached in 1. The guidance sets out how charging decisions are to be approached in
 cases involving joint enterprise. In particular, it addresses: cases involving joint enterprise. In particular, it addresses:
 +
 Application of the Full Code Test to cases involving joint enterprise. Application of the Full Code Test to cases involving joint enterprise.
 The use of evidence of presence and association in proving The use of evidence of presence and association in proving
 participation in a joint enterprise. participation in a joint enterprise.
- The principles to be applied when selecting charges that involve+ 
 +The principles to be applied when selecting charges that involve
 principal, secondary and inchoate liability. principal, secondary and inchoate liability.
- The approach to charging group assaults, including cases of murder+ 
 +The approach to charging group assaults, including cases of murder
 and manslaughter. and manslaughter.
- Charging offences under the Serious Crime Act 2007.+ 
 +Charging offences under the Serious Crime Act 2007. 
 2. Insofar as this guidance attempts to set out the law on secondary liability, 2. Insofar as this guidance attempts to set out the law on secondary liability,
 what it sets out is the Crown Prosecution Service’s understanding,​ which does what it sets out is the Crown Prosecution Service’s understanding,​ which does
 not have the force of law. not have the force of law.
 +
 Concerns Concerns
 +
 3. Concerns about the application of the doctrine of joint enterprise resulted in 3. Concerns about the application of the doctrine of joint enterprise resulted in
 a House of Commons Justice Committee inquiry in 2011-12. The Committee a House of Commons Justice Committee inquiry in 2011-12. The Committee
 published its report in January 2012, which recommended that the DPP issue published its report in January 2012, which recommended that the DPP issue
-2/20  
 guidance on the use of the doctrine when charging, including the relationship guidance on the use of the doctrine when charging, including the relationship
 between association and complicity. between association and complicity.
 +
 The doctrine of joint enterprise The doctrine of joint enterprise
 +
 4. Courts and academics have expressed different opinions on the meaning of 4. Courts and academics have expressed different opinions on the meaning of
 the common law doctrine of joint enterprise. Although some academics the common law doctrine of joint enterprise. Although some academics
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 cases where those involved share a common purpose to commit crime X, and cases where those involved share a common purpose to commit crime X, and
 cases where there is no shared purpose. cases where there is no shared purpose.
 +
 5. Joint enterprise can apply where two or more persons are involved in an 5. Joint enterprise can apply where two or more persons are involved in an
 offence or offences. The parties to a joint enterprise may be principals (P) or offence or offences. The parties to a joint enterprise may be principals (P) or
 secondary parties (accessories / accomplices) (D). secondary parties (accessories / accomplices) (D).
 +
 6. A principal is one who carries out the substantive offence i.e. performs the 6. A principal is one who carries out the substantive offence i.e. performs the
 conduct element of the offence with the required fault element. conduct element of the offence with the required fault element.
 +
 7. A secondary party is one who assists or encourages (sometimes referred to 7. A secondary party is one who assists or encourages (sometimes referred to
 as “aids, abets, counsels or procures”) P to commit the substantive offence, as “aids, abets, counsels or procures”) P to commit the substantive offence,
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 prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender: s8 Accessories prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender: s8 Accessories
 and Abettors Act 1861. and Abettors Act 1861.
 +
 8. Secondary liability principles can be applied to most offences. The 8. Secondary liability principles can be applied to most offences. The
 principles remain the same, whichever offence they are applied to. The principles remain the same, whichever offence they are applied to. The
 principles are commonly used in offences of violence, theft, fraud and public principles are commonly used in offences of violence, theft, fraud and public
 order. order.
 +
 9. A joint enterprise may or may not be pre-planned. Sometimes a jointly 9. A joint enterprise may or may not be pre-planned. Sometimes a jointly
 committed crime occurs spontaneously. The applicable law is the same in committed crime occurs spontaneously. The applicable law is the same in
 either case: R v Mendez and Thompson. either case: R v Mendez and Thompson.
 +
 Example Example
 People in a crowd of demonstrators suddenly start attacking a person People in a crowd of demonstrators suddenly start attacking a person
 who shouts abuse at them. who shouts abuse at them.
 +
 Three types of joint enterprise Three types of joint enterprise
 +
 10. In R v ABCD the Court of Appeal identified three ways in which a joint 10. In R v ABCD the Court of Appeal identified three ways in which a joint
 enterprise would usually operate, recognising that the scenarios may in some enterprise would usually operate, recognising that the scenarios may in some
 cases overlap (para 7): cases overlap (para 7):
-3/20 +
 (1) Where two or more people join in committing a single crime, in (1) Where two or more people join in committing a single crime, in
 circumstances where they are, in effect, all joint principals circumstances where they are, in effect, all joint principals
 +
 Examples Examples
 +
 1. P1 and P2 agree to commit a robbery. Each plays a part in carrying 1. P1 and P2 agree to commit a robbery. Each plays a part in carrying
 out the conduct element: together they attack and take money off out the conduct element: together they attack and take money off
 security men making a cash delivery. Both are liable for robbery as security men making a cash delivery. Both are liable for robbery as
 joint principals. joint principals.
 +
 2. P1 and P2 go on a shoplifting spree together, both taking goods out 2. P1 and P2 go on a shoplifting spree together, both taking goods out
 of shops without payment. They are joint principals. of shops without payment. They are joint principals.
 +
 3. P1 and P2 break into a house and they both help themselves to 3. P1 and P2 break into a house and they both help themselves to
 items of the owner’s property. P1 and P2 are both guilty of burglary as items of the owner’s property. P1 and P2 are both guilty of burglary as
 principal offenders. principal offenders.
 +
 In these cases each player has performed all the elements of the offence In these cases each player has performed all the elements of the offence
 (robbery or theft) in his own right. Little difficulty or controversy arises in (robbery or theft) in his own right. Little difficulty or controversy arises in
 respect of the liability of P1 and P2 in such cases. respect of the liability of P1 and P2 in such cases.
 +
 (2) Where D assists or encourages P to commit a single crime (2) Where D assists or encourages P to commit a single crime
 In this scenario, P, with the fault element, carries out the conduct element In this scenario, P, with the fault element, carries out the conduct element
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 need to be present at the scene of the offence. Both are liable for the offence. need to be present at the scene of the offence. Both are liable for the offence.
 P is liable as a principal. Ds liability as a secondary party is based on proving: P is liable as a principal. Ds liability as a secondary party is based on proving:
- P’s commission of the offence, although P need not be identified,+ 
 +P’s commission of the offence, although P need not be identified,
 charged or convicted. (Note that where the offence is committed charged or convicted. (Note that where the offence is committed
 through the medium of an innocent agent, such as a child or any other through the medium of an innocent agent, such as a child or any other
 person who is not criminally responsible,​ the person who incites the person who is not criminally responsible,​ the person who incites the
 crime is liable as a principal.) crime is liable as a principal.)
- D giving assistance or encouragement to P: R v Clarkson [1971] 1+ 
 +D giving assistance or encouragement to P: R v Clarkson [1971] 1
 WLR 1402; R v Jones and Mirrless (1977) 65 Cr. App. R. 250, CA. WLR 1402; R v Jones and Mirrless (1977) 65 Cr. App. R. 250, CA.
- D’s intent to assist or encourage: R v Clarkson; R v Jones and+ 
 +D’s intent to assist or encourage: R v Clarkson; R v Jones and
 Mirrless. Mirrless.
- D’s knowledge of the essential elements of P’s offence: Johnson v+ 
 +D’s knowledge of the essential elements of P’s offence: Johnson v
 Youdon [1950] 1 K.B. 544, DC. The courts have interpreted Youdon [1950] 1 K.B. 544, DC. The courts have interpreted
 knowledge broadly in this context. It has been held to include belief, knowledge broadly in this context. It has been held to include belief,
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 committed. See para 8.4.2.2 of Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th committed. See para 8.4.2.2 of Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th
 ed, 2011) for a detailed commentary. ed, 2011) for a detailed commentary.
 +
 Examples Examples
 +
 1. P and D commit a burglary. P alone enters as a trespasser and 1. P and D commit a burglary. P alone enters as a trespasser and
 steals from the premises. D assists or encourages P by driving P to steals from the premises. D assists or encourages P by driving P to
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 to commit burglary. Both are liable for the burglary, P as the principal, to commit burglary. Both are liable for the burglary, P as the principal,
 D as an accomplice. D as an accomplice.
-4/20 +
 2. D and P assault V causing ABH. D and P approach V. P punches V, 2. D and P assault V causing ABH. D and P approach V. P punches V,
 causing injuries that amount to ABH. D shouts encouragement to P causing injuries that amount to ABH. D shouts encouragement to P
 during the assault. P is liable as a principal; D is liable as an during the assault. P is liable as a principal; D is liable as an
 accomplice, for assisting and encouraging P. accomplice, for assisting and encouraging P.
 +
 3. D provides P with a weapon so that P can use it in a robbery. P is 3. D provides P with a weapon so that P can use it in a robbery. P is
 liable as a principal; D is liable as an accomplice. liable as a principal; D is liable as an accomplice.
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 course of it P commits a second crime (crime B) which D had foreseen course of it P commits a second crime (crime B) which D had foreseen
 he might commit he might commit
 +
 In this scenario, D may act as a principal or an accessory to crime A. D is also In this scenario, D may act as a principal or an accessory to crime A. D is also
 liable for crime B, as an accessory. It is not necessary that D wants or intends liable for crime B, as an accessory. It is not necessary that D wants or intends
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 case law in this area involves cases of murder and manslaughter,​ although case law in this area involves cases of murder and manslaughter,​ although
 the principles are applicable to other offences. the principles are applicable to other offences.
 +
 Examples Examples
 +
 1. D and P carry out a burglary (offence A). P acts as principal, 1. D and P carry out a burglary (offence A). P acts as principal,
 entering the premises and stealing. D assists or encourages P by entering the premises and stealing. D assists or encourages P by
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 UKHL 45; R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930; R v Mendez and UKHL 45; R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930; R v Mendez and
 Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516. Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516.
 +
 2. As in example 1 above, except that D only foresees that P might 2. As in example 1 above, except that D only foresees that P might
 commit an unlawful act (use unlawful force) with intent to cause some commit an unlawful act (use unlawful force) with intent to cause some
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 is liable for manslaughter:​ R v Rahman; R v Yemoh; R v Carpenter is liable for manslaughter:​ R v Rahman; R v Yemoh; R v Carpenter
 [2011] EWCA Crim 2568. [2011] EWCA Crim 2568.
 +
 11. Note that where two people are jointly indicted for the commission of a 11. Note that where two people are jointly indicted for the commission of a
 crime and the evidence does not point to one rather than the other, and there crime and the evidence does not point to one rather than the other, and there
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 causing or allowing the death or serious injury of a child under the age of 16 causing or allowing the death or serious injury of a child under the age of 16
 or of a vulnerable adult. or of a vulnerable adult.
-5/20 + 
 Transferred malice Transferred malice
 +
 12. The principle of transferred malice is often explained by reference to 12. The principle of transferred malice is often explained by reference to
 offences of violence: if D intends to kill or do really serious bodily harm to V1, offences of violence: if D intends to kill or do really serious bodily harm to V1,
 but by mistake kills V2 instead, he is guilty of murder of V2. but by mistake kills V2 instead, he is guilty of murder of V2.
 +
 13. The doctrine applies to secondary parties: D intentionally assists or 13. The doctrine applies to secondary parties: D intentionally assists or
 encourages P to murder V1 but P, intending to kill V1, mistakenly kills V2 encourages P to murder V1 but P, intending to kill V1, mistakenly kills V2
 instead. D is guilty of the murder of V2. instead. D is guilty of the murder of V2.
 +
 14. In R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 the Supreme Court used a combination of 14. In R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 the Supreme Court used a combination of
 the common law principles of secondary liability and the common law doctrine the common law principles of secondary liability and the common law doctrine
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 serious injury, or as an accessory to the act of firing the fatal shot (paras 60- serious injury, or as an accessory to the act of firing the fatal shot (paras 60-
 62). 62).
 +
 15. Transferred malice will not apply where P deliberately selects a different 15. Transferred malice will not apply where P deliberately selects a different
 victim from that foreseen by D. However, in such situations, consideration victim from that foreseen by D. However, in such situations, consideration
 should be given to a charge under the Serious Crime Act 2007, or a charge of should be given to a charge under the Serious Crime Act 2007, or a charge of
 conspiracy. conspiracy.
 +
 Qualifications on the scope of joint enterprise Qualifications on the scope of joint enterprise
 +
 16. There are two main qualifications that limit the scope of joint enterprise. 16. There are two main qualifications that limit the scope of joint enterprise.
 Persons will not be liable where: Persons will not be liable where:
- P’s act is fundamentally different to that foreseen by D; or + 
- D withdraws from the joint enterprise before the offence is committed.+P’s act is fundamentally different to that foreseen by D; or 
 + 
 +D withdraws from the joint enterprise before the offence is committed.
 Fundamentally different act Fundamentally different act
 +
 17. Where a principal does an act “fundamentally different” from that which 17. Where a principal does an act “fundamentally different” from that which
 was foreseen by D, P will be regarded as going beyond the scope of the joint was foreseen by D, P will be regarded as going beyond the scope of the joint
 enterprise, and D will not be liable for P’s act. enterprise, and D will not be liable for P’s act.
 +
 18. Whether what P did is fundamentally different from anything foreseen by 18. Whether what P did is fundamentally different from anything foreseen by
 D is a question of fact: R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930 (paragraph 140). D is a question of fact: R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930 (paragraph 140).
 +
 19. The question is determined by the jury: see para 63 R v Rahman for the 19. The question is determined by the jury: see para 63 R v Rahman for the
 appropriate direction to a jury. appropriate direction to a jury.
 +
 20. The court in R v Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516 20. The court in R v Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516
 expressed the test as whether P’s act was “of a nature likely to be altogether expressed the test as whether P’s act was “of a nature likely to be altogether
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 and therefore should be considered “in a different league” from what D and therefore should be considered “in a different league” from what D
 intended or foresaw (paragraph 48). intended or foresaw (paragraph 48).
-6/20 +
 Example Example
 +
 D and P intend to inflict really serious harm, by beating V with their D and P intend to inflict really serious harm, by beating V with their
 fists, but P produces a knife that D did not know P was carrying, and fists, but P produces a knife that D did not know P was carrying, and
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 that D either knew of the existence of the knife, or its use was foreseen that D either knew of the existence of the knife, or its use was foreseen
 by D. by D.
 +
 21. The fundamentally different act principle will not apply where the common 21. The fundamentally different act principle will not apply where the common
 purpose is achieved but P commits the offence in a different manner to that purpose is achieved but P commits the offence in a different manner to that
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 murder if P uses a gun to kill rather than a knife, which D had contemplated,​ murder if P uses a gun to kill rather than a knife, which D had contemplated,​
 or vice versa: see R v English and R v Mendez and Thompson. or vice versa: see R v English and R v Mendez and Thompson.
 +
 22. For a detailed summary of the way in which the courts have applied the 22. For a detailed summary of the way in which the courts have applied the
 principle in cases of murder and manslaughter see para 8.5.2.3 of Smith and principle in cases of murder and manslaughter see para 8.5.2.3 of Smith and
 Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th ed, 2011). Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th ed, 2011).
 Withdrawal Withdrawal
 +
 23. D will not be liable for the act of P where D withdraws from the joint 23. D will not be liable for the act of P where D withdraws from the joint
 enterprise before the offence is committed. enterprise before the offence is committed.
 +
 24. However, where D is not liable as a secondary party because of a 24. However, where D is not liable as a secondary party because of a
 withdrawal, he may nevertheless be liable for an inchoate offence, such as withdrawal, he may nevertheless be liable for an inchoate offence, such as
 conspiracy, attempt or an offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007 (see conspiracy, attempt or an offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007 (see
 below). below).
 +
 25. Whether D has withdrawn is a question of fact and degree, will depend on 25. Whether D has withdrawn is a question of fact and degree, will depend on
 the circumstances of each case, and is one for the jury to decide. the circumstances of each case, and is one for the jury to decide.
 +
 26. Factors that may be considered, for instance, are: the nature of the 26. Factors that may be considered, for instance, are: the nature of the
 assistance and encouragement given by D; how imminent the commission of assistance and encouragement given by D; how imminent the commission of
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 and the action that is said to constitute the withdrawal: R v O’Flaherty,​ Ryan and the action that is said to constitute the withdrawal: R v O’Flaherty,​ Ryan
 and Toussaint [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 20, CA. and Toussaint [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 20, CA.
 +
 27. R v Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396 makes clear that there may be 27. R v Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396 makes clear that there may be
 cases where any assistance or encouragement provided by D is so distanced cases where any assistance or encouragement provided by D is so distanced
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 spontaneous joint enterprise: where D starts to join in chasing V with hostile spontaneous joint enterprise: where D starts to join in chasing V with hostile
 intent, but quickly thinks better of it and stops, it would be unjust for D to be intent, but quickly thinks better of it and stops, it would be unjust for D to be
-7/20  
 automatically guilty of whatever violence was inflicted on V by others who automatically guilty of whatever violence was inflicted on V by others who
 continued to chase V (paras 52-53). continued to chase V (paras 52-53).
 +
 Prosecuting offences on the basis of joint enterprise Prosecuting offences on the basis of joint enterprise
 +
 28. Prosecutors may only start a prosecution if a case satisfies the Full Code 28. Prosecutors may only start a prosecution if a case satisfies the Full Code
 Test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. This test has two stages: the Test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. This test has two stages: the
 first is the requirement of evidential sufficiency and the second involves first is the requirement of evidential sufficiency and the second involves
 consideration of the public interest. consideration of the public interest.
 +
 29. At the evidential stage, a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is 29. At the evidential stage, a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is
 sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction. This means sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction. This means
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 prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence, including any information that he or prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence, including any information that he or
 she has about the defence. she has about the defence.
 +
 30. A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, no 30. A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, no
 matter how serious or sensitive it may be. matter how serious or sensitive it may be.
 +
 31. If the evidential stage is satisfied, prosecutors must then go on to consider 31. If the evidential stage is satisfied, prosecutors must then go on to consider
 the second stage: whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. the second stage: whether a prosecution is required in the public interest.
 The evidential stage applied to joint enterprise cases The evidential stage applied to joint enterprise cases
 +
 32. The evidential stage of the Full Code Test applies in the same way to 32. The evidential stage of the Full Code Test applies in the same way to
 cases involving joint enterprise as it does to all other cases. cases involving joint enterprise as it does to all other cases.
 +
 33. When assessing the sufficiency of evidence in a joint enterprise case a 33. When assessing the sufficiency of evidence in a joint enterprise case a
 prosecutor is likely to ask a number of the following questions: prosecutor is likely to ask a number of the following questions:
- Is there evidence that the defendants acted as joint principals?​ + 
- If not, did D assist or encourage another to commit offence A? +Is there evidence that the defendants acted as joint principals?​ 
- Or, did D assist or encourage P to commit offence A, foreseeing that+ 
 +If not, did D assist or encourage another to commit offence A? 
 + 
 +Or, did D assist or encourage P to commit offence A, foreseeing that
 P might carry out the conduct element of offence B, with the P might carry out the conduct element of offence B, with the
 necessary fault element of offence B? necessary fault element of offence B?
- Was P’s act fundamentally different from what was foreseen by D? + 
- Does D have a viable claim to have withdrawn from the joint+Was P’s act fundamentally different from what was foreseen by D? 
 + 
 +Does D have a viable claim to have withdrawn from the joint
 enterprise? enterprise?
 +
 34. Prosecutors should exercise particular care when assessing the questions 34. Prosecutors should exercise particular care when assessing the questions
 above in cases that involve: above in cases that involve:
- A spontaneous joint enterprise; and + 
- Youths and mentally disordered suspects.+A spontaneous joint enterprise; and 
 + 
 +Youths and mentally disordered suspects. 
 Participation Participation
 +
 35. The live issue in a joint enterprise case is often whether D has participated 35. The live issue in a joint enterprise case is often whether D has participated
 in the venture. This will involve proving that D by words or conduct assisted or in the venture. This will involve proving that D by words or conduct assisted or
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 foresight. Liability does not depend on D being present at the scene of the foresight. Liability does not depend on D being present at the scene of the
 offence. offence.
-8/20 +
 36. Without some participation by D, the following will not satisfy the evidential 36. Without some participation by D, the following will not satisfy the evidential
 stage: stage:
- Mere accidental presence at the scene of an offence. + 
- Association with the principal offender(s). +Mere accidental presence at the scene of an offence. 
- Association with or membership of a group or gang.+ 
 +Association with the principal offender(s). 
 + 
 +Association with or membership of a group or gang. 
 37. The court in R v Stringer addressed the difficulty in defining the evidential 37. The court in R v Stringer addressed the difficulty in defining the evidential
 threshold for participation:​ threshold for participation:​
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 P's act was done with D's assistance or encouragement” (para 51). P's act was done with D's assistance or encouragement” (para 51).
 Presence at the scene of an offence as evidence of participation Presence at the scene of an offence as evidence of participation
 +
 38. Mere accidental presence at the scene of an offence is not sufficient for D 38. Mere accidental presence at the scene of an offence is not sufficient for D
 to be liable as a secondary party. A number of authorities confirm that D must to be liable as a secondary party. A number of authorities confirm that D must
 assist or encourage P in some way. assist or encourage P in some way.
 +
 39. For example, D who stands outside a building while his friend commits a 39. For example, D who stands outside a building while his friend commits a
 burglary cannot be convicted of burglary without proof that he assisted or burglary cannot be convicted of burglary without proof that he assisted or
 encouraged his friend by, for example, acting as a lookout, or waiting to carry encouraged his friend by, for example, acting as a lookout, or waiting to carry
 off the stolen items, even if none in fact emerge. off the stolen items, even if none in fact emerge.
 +
 40. It follows that D’s voluntary and purposeful presence at the scene, 40. It follows that D’s voluntary and purposeful presence at the scene,
 depending on the circumstances of the case, may amount to assistance or depending on the circumstances of the case, may amount to assistance or
 encouragement to P, so as to assist or encourage P’s offence. In such encouragement to P, so as to assist or encourage P’s offence. In such
 circumstances,​ D may be liable as an accomplice. circumstances,​ D may be liable as an accomplice.
 +
 41. However, voluntary presence at the scene will not of course necessarily 41. However, voluntary presence at the scene will not of course necessarily
 amount to assistance or encouragement to P. For instance, in a case of amount to assistance or encouragement to P. For instance, in a case of
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 proof of D’s intent to assist or encourage (see, for example, R v Miah [2004] proof of D’s intent to assist or encourage (see, for example, R v Miah [2004]
 EWCA Crim 63. EWCA Crim 63.
 +
 42. Examples where D’s voluntary and purposeful presence may amount to 42. Examples where D’s voluntary and purposeful presence may amount to
 assistance or encouragement are: assistance or encouragement are:
-9/20 +
 Examples Examples
 +
 1. P rapes V. D1 and D2 hear V screaming and enter the room where 1. P rapes V. D1 and D2 hear V screaming and enter the room where
 the rape is taking place. They do not provide direct physical assistance, the rape is taking place. They do not provide direct physical assistance,
joint_enterprise.1506701638.txt.gz · Last modified: 2017/09/29 16:13 by frescom